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Abstract
This study estimates the effect of the online gaming industry on the commercial 
casino gaming industry. The findings from this study suggest that during the pre-UIGEA 
period, online gaming was a moderate substitute good for brick and mortar gaming in 
the U.S. During this early period in the online gaming market, which was characterized 
by loose regulation and relatively easy access, online gaming revenue is estimated to 
have cannibalized commercial casino revenue at a rate of 27 to 30 cents on the dollar. A 
discussion of this finding’s relevance to the current gaming market and the related policy 
considerations is provided. This study also led to the discovery of a seemingly valid 
instrumental variable, internet user rates, which can be used to correct internet gaming 
coefficient estimates for potential bias in future studies.
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Introduction
The adoption of online gaming in new jurisdictions tends to be touted by proponents 
as a voluntary source of tax revenue (Legislative Analyst’s Office, 2010). 
By regulating the industry, governments are thought to be able to increase 
public revenues through an online gaming tax. These taxes are typically 
levied on operators through a licensing fee and/or an excise tax applied to 
gross gaming revenue. 
To date, it has remained unclear what specific effect online gaming has 
had on traditional brick and mortar (B&M) gaming. In particular, have 
the two industries been gross-complements (an increase in the demand 
for industry leads to an increase in the demand for the other), or have they 
been gross-substitutes (an increase in the demand for one industry leads to 
a decrease in the demand for the other). This paper seeks to measure the 
nature of this relationship and the strength of the association. 
Significance
An understanding of the relationship between online gaming and brick and mortar 
gaming is an important concept for both policy makers and private operators. For private 
industries (or government-owned operators), the importance is clear. If the two industries 
are substitutes, they should be concerned about cannibalizing their own sales; if the 
industries are complements, they should explore how to leverage the benefits across the 
virtual and non-virtual gaming floor. 
For policy makers, the distinction is more subtle. Among other considerations, policy 
makers need to understand how the adoption of online gaming will affect the output and 
tax revenue generated by existing B&M operations. For example, suppose that online 
and B&M gaming are perfect substitutes and gross B&M revenue is taxed at 20%. The 
introduction of online gaming at a 10% tax rate would actually lead to a decrease in tax 
revenue – for every dollar in online gaming revenue, the government would receive $0.10, 
but they would lose $0.20 from foregone B&M tax revenue. An argument similar to this 
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one has been posited regarding the effect of legal casino adoption on lottery revenue 
(Walker, 2007a; Walker, 2007b). This argument of cross-industry tax effects is a specific 
application of the more general argument from the seminal work of Ramsey (1927), 
which provides a formal argument of the inter-relations between goods and excise taxes.
To date, there has been no published academic research that empirically estimates 
the relationship between online and B&M gaming demand. As online gaming continues 
to emerge as an area of interest for business research, understanding the nature of its 
relationship with B&M gaming will be important for building theoretical and empirical 
models. 
Literature Review
Overview of Online Gaming in the United States
The first recorded online casino to accept a wager was Intertops.com, based and 
licensed in Antigua, which occurred in January 1996 (Business Wire, 2005). The online 
gaming industry then grew to roughly 15 casinos by the end of 1996, 650 at the end of 
1999, and 1,800 sites by the end of 2002 (Schwartz, 2006). The first online poker room, 
PlanetPoker, opened in 1998 and was quickly followed by many others (Williams & 
Woods, 2007). 
Online gaming continued to grow in the United States until October 2006, when the 
Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act (UIGEA) was passed as an addition to the 
Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006. This measure effectively made 
it illegal for any financial transaction provider to transfer funds to online sites that take 
bets on “outcomes of a contest, sports event or a game of chance” (Smith et al., 2007).1 
2 Although this act did not make the specific act of betting illegal for the consumer, the 
increased difficulty of financial transactions, and increasing uncertainty over the legality 
of online gaming in the average consumer’s eyes, had a negative effect on online gaming 
demand, and caused some foreign operators to exit the U.S. market (Rose, 2010). The 
largest operator at the time, Party Gaming, was among the companies that left the U.S. 
market. At the time, the U.S. online gaming industry was estimated to produce roughly 6 
billion in revenue per year, while the commercial casino industry generated 32 billion in 
revenue (Christiansen Capital Advisors, 2007; American Gaming Association, 2007).
Gaming Taxation Policy 
The use of gaming regulation to generate tax revenue is often cited as a way to avoid 
politically dubious tax increases while addressing budget shortfalls (Furlong, 1998; 
Smith, 1999; Smith, 2000). Although the assumed electoral consequences of fiscal policy 
changes have become the topic of recent debate (Alesina, Carloni, & Lecce, 2010), the 
use of a Ramsey taxation framework, which applies excise taxes to generate a specific 
amount of revenue (as opposed to using taxes to fund the financing of a public good), 
appears to be a reasonable assumption of general policy practices (Ramsey, 1927). 
When cross-effects between goods’ demand are ignored, Ramsey (1927) suggests 
that tax rates be inversely proportional to own-price elasticities of demand. However, 
the introduction of cross-effects between goods complicates this axiom. Taxation on 
a good must account for how distortions in demand for that good affect demand for 
complementary and substitute goods. This concept has been noted by some gaming 
researchers such as Smith (1999), “Empirical research on elasticity of gaming demand 
has provided little practical guidance along these lines for taxation policy and design…
Estimating gambling demand elasticities is complicated by the extent to which different 
gambling products are substitutes,” but policy applications and research into cross-
effects remain limited.
1 The SAFE Port Act had no direct relation to gaming, prior to the late addition of the UIGEA provisions. It 
is an act designed to address maritime and cargo security.
2 The provisions outlined in the UIGEA did not come into full effect prior to June 1, 2010, though most 
operators had already fully complied with the act, prior to that date.
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between some industries, but none for online gaming. The relationships are all noted to be either 
nil or substitutionary (as opposed to complementary).
Table 1
Relationships between Gaming Sectors – Maximum Reported Empirical Estimates3
Gaming Sector 
From\To
Casino(1) Gaming 
Machines
Lottery Betting
Services(2)
Casino -27% -27% -20% -32%
Gaming Machines -27% -27% -20% -32%
Lottery -3%
(low-end)
-3%
(low-end)
Substitute 
Magnitude 
Unknown
-36%
Betting Services 0% 0% Weak Substitute -17%
Note: Reproduced from Swiss Institute of Comparative Law (2006)
(1) Results are largely from studies of U.S. venues where slot machines are by far the largest component of casino GGRs. The 
effects of competition on casinos and gaming machines are assumed to be equal for this analysis.
(2) Assumes that these are predominantly horse and sports betting services.
In his early study of direct gaming demand elasticities, Suits (1979) estimates the 
elasticity of demand for bookmaking services in Nevada, using data from the reduction of the 
federal excise tax on bookmaking at the end of 1974. He generates an elastic range from -1.64 to 
-2.17, indicating that the percent change in demand will be greater than the percentage change in 
price. He also estimates elastic demand for betting at thoroughbred race tracks from a panel data 
set of states offering horse racing, ranging from -1.59 to -2.14. Morgan and Vasche (1982) used 
two multiple regression equations to measure the effect of real disposable income, 
unemployment, and price of wagering (takeout rate) on pari-mutuel wagering demand. Wagering 
demand was split into two variables, wagering per attendance and attendance per capita. The 
authors estimate elasticity of pari-mutuel wagering with respect to price is -1.3. In his study of 
3 Empty Bingo related cells were removed
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Estimates of Gaming Demand Responses
In terms of cross- effects within the gaming industry, Walker and Jackson (2008) use 
a system of seemingly unrelated regression (probit) models to estimate the volume of 
casino, dog racing, horse racing, and lottery gaming industries as a function of the other 
industries’ volume, and other control variables. A statistically significant relationship 
is found with all cross-effects except for dog racing volumes and casino volumes, and 
Indian casino square footage and dog racing volume. Casino gaming is noted to have a 
negative relationship with lottery gaming, but a positive relationship with horse racing. 
In their review of gaming services in the European Union, the Swiss Institute of 
Comparative Law (2006) provides a summary table (reproduced in T ble 1 below) of 
the known relationships among gaming industries. The authors provide estimates of the 
cross-elasticities between some industries, but none for online gaming. The relationships 
are all noted to be either nil or substitutionary (as opposed to complementary).
Table 1
In his early study of direct gaming demand elasticities, Suits (1979) esti ates the 
elasticity of demand for bookmaking services in Nevada, using data from the reduction 
of the federal excise tax on bookmaking at the end of 1974. He generates an elastic range 
from -1.64 to -2.17, indicating that the percent change in demand will be greater than the 
percentage change in price. He also estimates elastic demand for betting at thoroughbred 
race tracks from a panel data set of states offering horse racing, ranging from -1.59 to 
-2.14. Morgan and Vasche (1982) used two multiple regression equations to measure the 
effect of real di posable income, unemployment, and price of wagering (take ut rate) on 
pari-mutuel wagering demand. Wagering demand was split into two variables, wagering 
p r attendance and attendan e per capita. The authors estimate elasticity of pari-mutuel 
wagering with respect to price is -1.3. In his study of Illinois casinos, Landers (2008a; 
2008b) estimates the price elasticity of casino gaming between -0.8 and -1.0. Landers 
(2008a) also notes that estimates of price elasticities in prior literature vary between 
-0.19 (lottery) and -2.81 (betting services). Thalheimer and Ali (2003) compute a log-log 
model that allowed them to infer elasticities directly from the model coefficients. The 
authors estimate an elastic (-1.5) price elasticity of demand in 1991, which decreased to 
an inelastic v lu  (-0.9) by 1998.
Methodology
Overview
This study estimates two time-series regression models to determine the effect 
of online gaming revenue on brick and mortar gaming revenue. The model seeks to 
estimate the relationship between real (inflation adjusted) U.S. online gaming revenue 
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and real U.S. commercial casino consumer spending. In order to address potential bias 
in coefficient estimate of online gaming revenue, an instrumental variable method, two-
stage least squares (2SLS), is used to estimate the model coefficients. An ARIMA model 
is also computed to evaluate the robustness of the findings.
Data
A large portion of online gaming activity takes place on foreign sites, which are 
operating in countries with dubious regulation and reporting requirements. This makes 
any analysis of the online gaming industry challenging, and dependent on market 
estimates. In this study, data on the United States online gaming industry was made 
available as a result of a trade dispute at the WTO between Antigua and the U.S. 
(Christiansen Capital Advisors, 2007). The annual online gaming data covers the period 
from 1999 to 2006, the year the UIGEA came into effect. The use of pre-UIGEA data 
provides a revealing period to monitor the consumer behavior effects of online gaming, 
since the lack of significant regulation allowed operators and consumers to interact 
with fewer market restrictions. Since not all online gaming operators are required to 
file their revenue values with the government or another institution, the value provided 
by Christiansen Capital Advisors (2007) are estimates, and not precise audited values. 
Although the use of estimates may lead to inference issues, it should not bias the 
parameter estimates. Data for 1998 was coded by applying the 1998 to 1999 World 
estimates of online gaming by Christiansen Capital Advisors (2007) to the U.S. estimates 
from 1999. For the period from 1988 to 1998, online gaming revenues were assumed 
to be insignificant, and were coded as zero. The use of linearly approximated revenue 
levels from 1995, when online gaming revenues were known to be zero (Business 
Wire, 2005), and the last Christiansen Capital Advisors (2007) estimate in 1998, did 
not significantly alter the results. Therefore, the results appear to be robust to the minor 
estimation errors in 1996 and 1997. 
Total commercial gross gaming revenue for the United States was obtained from the 
American Gaming Association (2010). The nominal values of B&M gaming revenue 
and online gaming revenue were converted to real values, by applying the U.S. CPI-U 
consumer price index (U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2010). 
Real U.S. gross domestic product was obtained from the International Monetary 
Fund (2010). Commercial casino availability data was obtained from Walker (2007a) 
and the American Gaming Association (2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007). Summary 
statistics for all estimation data is provided in Appendix B. 
Omitted Data
The National Indian Gaming Commission (NIGC) was solicited for Indian gaming 
revenues, however the NIGC was unable to provide data that predated 1998, and 
therefore Indian gaming revenue was not included as an independent variable. Also 
missing is a price variable. In empirical studies of the gaming industry, price is typically 
operationalized as the house advantage for a given game (Eadington, 1999). Since 
this study examines the U.S. gaming industries as a whole, it is not possible to include 
price in the model, as there is no index of overall house advantage for the U.S. gaming 
industry as a whole. The model design addresses potential bias from variable omission 
through an instrumental variable estimation method. In their study of intrastate industry 
relationships, Walker and Jackson (2008) previously estimate cross-industry effects 
without a price variable.
Instrumental Variable Approach
In producing estimates of gaming revenue relationships using long-term time 
series, the potential for omitted variable bias to enter the model error term becomes an 
increasing concern, as there is no reliable proxy variable that can address the changes in 
gamblers’ and society’s attitudes towards gaming over the 18 year period of this study. 
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If the model error term, te , contains omitted variables, such as attitudes towards gaming 
or Indian gaming revenue, which are correlated with the independent variables, biased 
coefficients may be estimated.3 
In order to address the potentially endogenous online gaming variable, this study 
uses an instrumental variable approach, two-stage least squares, to obtain a consistent 
estimate of its effects. Instrumental variable estimation uses an exogenous variable that 
is uncorrelated with the structural model error term, but correlated with the potentially 
endogenous variable to obtain consistent coefficient estimates.4
Number of internet users per 100 people was used as an instrument for online 
gaming revenue. The data was obtained from the International Telecommunication 
Union (2010). The availability of no other potentially valid instruments inhibits the use 
an overidentification test to measure whether internet user rates and the unexplained 
variance in B&M gaming are correlated, but it seems intuitively unlikely that there 
would be a statistically significant relationship between these two variables. The non-
zero correlation assumption between internet user rates and online gaming revenue 
seems intuitively plausible, as it may be the case that as the population of people with 
access to the internet grows, so will the number of people gambling on the internet. This 
assumption is tested in the results section.
Estimation Framework
The reduced form (first stage) model that was estimated was specified as follows:
The structural model that was estimated was specified as follows:
3  As mentioned above, Indian gaming and price are also omitted variables of concern.
4 See, for example, Wooldridge (2010) for further discussion of instrumental variable methods.
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The structural model that was estimated was specified as follows:
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Results
First Stage Tests
As shown in Table 2, internet subscription rate is a statistically significant predictor of 
online gaming revenue; t(11) = 4.46, p=.001. The F-stat value for the instrumental variable was 
F(1, 11) = 19.92, greater than the threshold of 10 indicating a good instrument and satisfying the 
( , ) 0t tCov IS OG ≠ condition (Sovey and Green, 2011). As expected, the prior years’ number of 
internet users is positively correlated with current year internet gaming revenue
Table 2
Reduced Form Model Summary
Beta Robust S.E. t-stat p-value
(Constant) -2.635 3.067 2.77 0.018
LAG Internet Users Per 100 0.122 0.027 4.46 0.001
Real Gross Domestic Product -0.001 <0.001 -2.57 0.026
Number of Commercial Casino 
States
0.126 0.117 1.08 0.305
LAG Real B&M Revenue -0.037 0.103 -0.36 0.722
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5 See, for example, Wooldridge (2010) for further discussion of instrumental variable methods.
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Results
First Stage Tests
As shown in Table 2, internet subscription rate is a statistically significant predictor of 
online gaming revenue; t(11) = 4.46, p=.001. The F-stat value for the instrumental variable 
was F(1, 11) = 19.92, greater than the threshold of 10 indicating a good instrument and 
satisfying the ( , ) 0t tCov IS OG � condition (Sovey and Green, 2011). As expected, 
the prior years’ number of internet users is positively correlated with current year internet 
gaming revenue
Table 2
Two-Stage Least Squares Results
The general model findings are provided in Table 3, below. The structural model, 
which estimated the effect of online gaming on the commercial casino industry, appeared 
to explain the variance in the dependent variable well, as the centered R2 value was 
0.996, although the high adjusted R2 is also a function of the relatively small sample 
size and the use of an autocorrelative term. An initial test for homoskedasticity indicated 
non-constant variance F(4, 12) = 4399.43, p<0.001.
5 Therefore, standard errors robust to 
any arbitrary forms of heteroskedasticity were estimated using the robust procedure in 
Stata (StataCorp LP, 2009). To address small sample issues in the parameter estimates, 
a finite sample adjustment is used with the robust setting using the small procedure 
in Stata (StataCorp LP, 2009). The test for autocorrelation failed to show a significant 
autocorrelative term, t = -2.21, p=0.052, therefore no corrections were made to compute 
autocorrelation robust standard errors.6 The Shapiro-Wilks test failed to show a 
significant departure from normality, z = -1.612, p=0.947. 
Table 3
Online gaming is found to be negatively related to commercial casino revenue, 
indicating the two goods are substitutes. A one dollar increase in online gaming revenue is 
estimated to coincide with a 28 cent reduction in commercial casino revenue. Real GDP 
is positively related to commercial casino revenue, suggesting that it is a normal good. 
Number of commercial casino states and the lagged value of gross commercial casino 
revenue were positively related to the dependent variable. All control variables’ estimate 
5 See the procedure outlined on page 535 of Wooldridge (2006).
6 See the procedure outlined on page 537 of Wooldridge (2006).
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Two-Stage Least Squares Results
The general model findings are provided in Table 3, below. The structural model, which 
estimated the effect of online gaming on the commercial casino industry, appeared to explain the 
variance in the dependent variable well, as the centered R2 value was 0.996, although the high 
adjusted R2 is also a function of the relatively small sample size and the use of an autocorrelative 
term. An initial test for homoskedasticity indicated non-constant variance F(4, 12) = 4399.43,
p<0.001.6 Therefore, standard errors robust to any arbitrary forms of heteroskedasticity wer  
estimated using the robust procedure in Stata (StataCorp LP, 2009). To address small sample 
issues in the parameter estimates, a finite sample adjustment is used with the robust setting using 
the small procedure in Stata (StataCorp LP, 2009). The test for autocorrelation failed to show a 
significant autocorrelative term, t = -2.21, p=0.052, ther fore no corrections were made to 
compute autocorrelation robust standard errors.7 The Shapiro-Wilks test failed to show a 
significant departure from normality, z = -1.612, p=0.947.
Table 3
Structural Model Summary
Beta Robust S.E. t-stat p-value
(Constant) -6.5331 1.1445 -5.71 <0.001
Real Online Gaming Revenue -0.2767 0.1247 -2.22 0.049
Real Gross Domestic Product 0.0010 0.0002 5.41 <0.001
Number of Commercial Casino 
States
0.4379 0.1080 4.05 0.002
LAG Real B&M Revenue 0.4775 0.1129 4.23 0.001
6 See the procedure outlined on page 535 of Wooldridge (2006).
7 See the procedure outlined on page 537 of Wooldridge (2006).
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directions are in line with economic theory and are significant at the 0.05 alpha level.
Income (GDP) Elasticities
As a robustness check, the GDP elasticity from the 2SLS model is compared to 
estimates of income elasticities from prior literature. An income elasticity value measures 
the percentage change in gaming revenue given a one percentage change in income. 
Since observations of internet gaming revenue in early years of the data set were equal 
to zero, elasticities in the model could not be interpreted directly from a log-log model 
specification, but instead were computed indirectly from the linear model.7 The short-
run income elasticity computed was 0.74 and the long-run income elasticity was 1.41. 
Nichols and Tosun (2007) estimated that state long-run income elasticities with respect 
to casino gaming varied widely. The authors measured a range from 0.22 to 2.29, which 
includes both the short-run and long-run estimates from this study. Landers’ (2008b) 
study on the demand for casino gaming estimated income elasticities from 1.43 to 1.91, 
much closer to the long-run elasticity than the short-run. This difference may be due 
in part to the emergence and rapid growth of internet gaming during the period of this 
study, as compared to the established casino period studied in Landers (2008b).
ARIMA Modeling
Although the instrumental variable approach addresses potential model endogeneity 
in the online gaming revenue parameter estimates, it does not address concerns over 
potential unit root issues in the data. That is, if the variables measured in the model 
are non-stationary, the coefficient estimates may suffer from spurious correlation, and 
therefore be biased. To evaluate whether the results from the two-stage model suffer from 
this issue, this section includes an ARIMA modeling process to render the variables from 
the 2SLS process stationary and control for unknown model parameters. ARIMA models 
use autoregressive (AR), integrated (I), and moving average (MA) terms to predict the 
dependent variable. In this study, variables are first rendered stationary to satisfy the 
integration term, and then an ARMA model is fitted using the Bayesian Information 
Criterion (BIC) selection method (Schwarz, 1979).8
 
Trend Stationary Tests
To test whether the variables used in this model are stationary processes, an 
augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test is conducted. Non-stationary variables are then 
differenced and re-tested until a stationary process is revealed. Table 4 summarizes 
the results of the unit root tests. A second difference of each model variable is noted to 
produce series that satisfy the unit root test at the 0.05 alpha level. Therefore, second 
differences of the variables are used in the ARIMA process.
Table 4 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test Statistics
7 For a proof of the elasticity formulas, see appendix A.
8 Due to the limited number of observations, only ARMA processes up to three are evaluated to minimize the 
  BIC.
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Table 4
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test Statistics
Variable No 
Difference
p-value First 
Difference
p-value Second 
Difference
p-value
Brick & Mortar Revenue -1.055 .733 -2.568 .100 -2.872 .049
Real Online Gaming 
Revenue 
0.712 .990 -2.046 .267 -4.615 <.001
Real Gross Domestic 
Product
0.843 .992 -2.304 .171 -3.769 .003
9 Due to the limited number of observations, only ARMA processes up to three are evaluated to minimize the BIC.
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Number of Commercial 
Casino States
-2.654 .082 -1.542 .513 -5.350 <.001
ARIMA Results
As mentioned, ARIMA processes integrated of order two, with up to three autoregressive 
or moving average terms were estimated and the final model was selected using a BIC 
minimization procedure. The final specification was an ARIMA (2, 2, 3) process with real online 
gaming revenue and real gross domestic product as independent variables. Following the criteria 
for model evaluation, the final model specification dropped the number of states with 
commercial casinos variable.10
Table 5
Results are provided in Table 5.
ARIMA Model Output
Variable Beta
Real Online Gaming Revenue -0.2959**
(0.0305)
Real Gross Domestic Product 0.0018**
(0.0005)
AR (1) 0.2317
(0.3213)
AR (2) -0.3541
(0.3058)
MA (1) 0.1037
(0.2172)
MA (2) -0.1037
(0.2172)
MA (3) -1.000**
(<0.001)
Heteroskedastically robust standard errors are provided in brackets
*denotes significant at the 0.05 level, **denotes significant at the 0.01 level
n=17, BIC=28.81, Wald Chi2(6) = 9.4x1011, p<0.001.
10 In some ARIMA model specifications, the maximum likelihood function could not be maximized with all 
explanatory variables. In these cases, reduced form models were estimated.
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Although the instrumental variable approach addresses potential model endogeneity in 
the online gaming revenue parameter estimates, it does not address concerns over potential unit 
root issues in the data. That is, if the variables measured in the model are non-stationary, the 
coefficient estimates may suffer from spurious correlation, and therefore be biased. To evaluate 
whether the results from the two-stage model suffer from this issue, this section includes an 
ARIMA modeling process to render the variables from the 2SLS process stationary and control 
for unknown model parameters. ARIMA models use autoregressive (AR), integrated (I), and 
oving average (MA) terms to predict the dependent vari bl . In this study, variables are first 
rende ed stationary to satisfy th int g ation term, and the  an ARMA model is fitted using the 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) sel ction method (Schwarz, 1979).9
Trend Stationary Tests
To tes  whether the variables used in this mo el are stationary processes, an augmented 
Dickey-Fuller unit root test is conducted. Non-stationary variables are then differenced and re-
tested until a sta nary process is revealed. Table 4 summarizes the results of the unit root tests. 
A second difference of each model variable is noted to produce series that satisfy the unit root 
test at the 0.05 alpha lev l. The ef re, econd differences of th  variables are used in the ARIMA 
process.
able 4
Aug ented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test Statistics
Variable No 
Difference
p-value First 
Difference
p-value Second 
Difference
p-value
Brick & Mortar Revenue -1 055 .733 -2.568 .100 -2.872 .049
Real Online Gaming 
Revenue 
0.712 .990 -2.046 .267 -4.615 <.001
Real Gross Do estic 
Product
0.843 .992 -2.304 .171 -3.769 .003
9 Due to the limit d number of observations, nly ARMA processes up to thre  ar evaluated to minimize the BIC.
14
Although the instrumental var able appro ch a dress s pot ntial model endogeneity in 
the onli e gaming revenue parameter estimates, it does ot a dr ss concerns over potential unit 
roo  issues in the dat . T at is, if he variable  m asured in the model re non-stationary, the 
coefficient est mates may suffer from spu ous co rela ion, and therefore be biased. To evaluate 
w ther th results from th  two-stag  model suff r from this i sue, this se tion includes an 
ARIMA modeling process to render he variables from the 2SLS process stationary and con rol 
for unknown model parameters. ARIMA models use autoregressive (AR), integrated (I), and 
moving average (MA) terms to predict the dependent variable. In this study, variables are first 
rendered st tion ry to sat fy the integr tion te m, and then an ARMA model is fitted using the 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) selec ion ethod (Schwarz, 1979).9
Trend Stati nary Tests
To test whether the variabl s us  in this model are stationa y processes, a  augmented
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test at the 0.05 alpha level. Therefore, second differences of the variables are used in the ARIMA 
process.
Table 4
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test Statistics
Variable No 
Difference
p-value First 
Difference
p-value Second 
Difference
p-value
Brick & Mortar Revenue -1.055 .733 -2.568 .100 -2.872 .049
Real Online Gaming 
Revenue 
0.712 .990 -2.046 .267 -4.615 <.001
Real Gross Domestic 
Product
0.843 .992 -2.304 .171 -3.769 .003
9 Due to the limited number of observations, only ARMA processes up to three are evaluated to minimize the BIC.
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ARIMA Results
As mentioned, ARIMA processes integrated of order two, with up to three 
autoregressive or moving average terms were estimated and the final model was selected 
using a BIC minimization procedure. The final specification was an ARIMA (2, 2, 3) 
process with real online gaming revenue and real gross domestic product as independent 
variables. Following the criteria for model evaluation, the final model specification 
dropped the number of states with commercial casinos variable.9 Results are provided in 
Table 5.
Table 5 
ARIMA Model Output
The model produced an online gaming revenue coefficient estimate of -0.296. This 
value is the same direction and similar in order of magnitude as the estimate from the 
2SLS model, differing in actual effect by only 0.019. A one dollar increase in online 
gaming revenue is estimated to coincide with a 30 cent reduction in commercial casino 
revenue under this model’s estimation. The real GDP estimate is also significant and the 
same direction as in the 2SLS model, differing by a value of 0.0008.
Discussion
The findings from this study suggest that online gaming was a gross substitute for 
commercial casino gaming during the pre-UIGEA period. Although both the 2SLS 
model and the ARIMA model estimated in this study may suffer from different sources 
of bias – unit root issues in the 2SLS model and endogeneity issues in the ARIMA model 
– both produce results that are similar to each other. Both also support the contention of 
substitution between online and offline gaming. The income elasticities measured in the 
model also appear to be consistent with the findings from prior gaming literature, further 
adding to the robustness of the findings. This study therefore provides some evidence 
that in an online gaming market characterized by loose regulation, and relatively easy 
access, online gaming will cannibalize some commercial casino revenue at a rate of 27 
to 30 cents on the dollar. Policy makers and industry practitioners should consider this 
effect when evaluating whether or not to enter the online gaming sector.
Despite the robustness of the findings across different models in this study, the short 
10  In some ARIMA model specifications, the maximum likelihood function could not be maximized 
        with all explanatory variables. In these cases, reduced form models were estimated.
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Number of Commercial 
Casino States
-2.654 .082 -1.542 .513 -5.350 <.001
ARIMA Results
As mentioned, ARIMA processes integrated of order two, with up to three autoregressive 
or moving average terms were estimated and the final model was selected using a BIC 
minimization procedure. The final specification was an ARIMA (2, 2, 3) process with real online 
gaming revenue and real gross domestic product as independent variables. Following the criteria 
for model evaluation, the final model specification dropped the number of states with 
commercial casinos variable.10
Table 5
Results are provided in Table 5.
ARIMA Model Output
Variable Beta
Real Online Gaming Revenue -0.2959**
(0.0305)
Real Gross Domestic Product 0.0018**
(0.0005)
AR (1) 0.2317
(0.3213)
AR (2) -0.3541
(0.3058)
MA (1) 0.1037
(0.2172)
MA (2) -0.1037
(0.2172)
MA (3) -1.000**
(<0.001)
Heteroskedastically robust standard errors are provided in brackets
*denotes significant at the 0.05 level, **denotes significant at the 0.01 level
n=17, BIC=28.81, Wald Chi2(6) = 9.4x1011, p<0.001.
10 In some ARIMA model specifications, the maximum likelihood function c uld not be maximized with all 
explanatory variables. In these cases, reduced form models were estimated.
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history of online gaming led to a fairly small data set. Therefore, some caution should 
be exercised when using these results in decision making processes. As data in more 
markets and over different time periods becomes available, researchers should explore 
how robust those estimates are compared to these. Also, given that this study aggregated 
all online gaming sources, policy makers and industry practitioners should be cautious 
when using these estimates to evaluate the effect of a policy change to a single product. 
It may be the case that some online gaming products with purposeful co-marketing, such 
as online poker (where players can qualify for B&M tournaments through smaller online 
tournaments) are gross complements, leading to an increase in demand for their brick and 
mortar counterparts.
In light of this being a seminal study on the effect of online 
gaming on offline gaming, many factors remain unclear in terms of 
the proper interpretation of the long-run effect of online gaming on 
brick and mortar casinos. First, it seems likely that U.S. consumer 
behavior has changed in both the post-UIGEA and the post-Black 
Friday regulatory eras, which differ from the period of this study.10 
The legality of gaming online and the safety of account deposits 
has become an increasing concern for players as a result of these two market shifts. It is 
especially unclear how consumers’ consumption patterns would respond to the provision 
of government regulated gaming sites, provided by reputable gaming operators. Case 
studies of other jurisdictions with legal online gaming, such as Sweden, the UK, or the 
Canadian provinces of British Columbia and Quebec, may provide some insight in this 
regard. Regulation of online gaming may simply shift consumption from foreign sites to 
domestic sites, with little cross-effect on existing brick and mortar casinos, or it may lead 
to more opportunities for co-marketing between online and offline platforms, and reduce 
the substitutionary nature of these two products.
The findings from this study also estimated the average effects of the online gaming 
industry on brick and mortar gaming, while decision makers should focus on the marginal 
effects from increased activity. In particular, stakeholders should 
consider how the incremental online casino consumer would 
patronize brick and mortar casinos. It is worth noting that online 
gaming remains a small part of the overall U.S. gaming market. In 
2006, the year the UIGEA was enacted, online gaming constituted 
only 6.4% of the total U.S. gaming market (Christiansen Captial 
Advisors, 2007). If policy changes are made to regulate the industry, 
the impact on B&M casinos may be modest given the comparative 
size of the industries, and the expectation that many consumers will 
simply be shifting consumption from illegal gaming providers to 
government regulated providers.
In addition to those policy findings, this study led to the 
discovery of a seemingly valid instrumental variable, internet user 
rates, that can be used to correct internet gaming coefficient estimates for potential bias. 
This instrument may prove useful for other researchers exploring the different cross-
effects of sub-industries within online gaming. For example, a similar study could be 
conducted to determine whether online poker has a positive relationship with brick and 
mortar poker, as some believe to be the case.
11 Black Friday refers to April 15, 2011, when the three largest online poker sites, Pokerstars, Full Tilt Poker, 
  and Absolute Poker, left the U.S. market in response to indictments by the Southern District of New York.
The Effect of Online Gaming on Commercial Casino Revenue
The findings from this study 
suggest that online gaming was 
a gross substitute for commercial 
casino gaming during the pre-
UIGEA period. 
Despite the robustness of the 
findings across different models 
in this study, the short history 
of online gaming led to a fairly 
small data set. Therefore, some 
caution should be exercised 
when using these results in 
decision making processes. 
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Appendix A – Proof of Elasticity Estimates
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Appendix B – Summary Statistics
 
Variable Observation Mean Standard Deviation
Real Brick & Mortar Gaming 
Revenue 19 13.192 4.3706
Real Internet Gaming Revenue 19 1.085 1.4207
Number of US States with 
Commercial Gaming 19 8.684 3.1279
US Real GDP 19 10027.39 1767.876
Internet User Rates per 100 17 32.3473 26.9426
Appendix B - Summary Statistics
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